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harvest, namely the proceeds of these two 
life insurance policies .. . "Gilbert at 459. 
Afterwards Judge Raymond G. Thieme, 
Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County held evidentiary hearings pursuant 
to Md Rule BV9 and used Judge Proctor's 
findings to conclude that Gilbert purpose-
fully failed to disclose the civil suit and 
this nondisclosure was material so as to 
violate DR 1-lOl(a) and DR 1-102 & (4) of 
the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. A judge's factual findings are 
prima facie correct and will not be changed 
unless clearly erroneous. Attorney Griev-
ance Comm. v. Kemp 303 Md. 664, 674, 
496 A.2d 672 (1985). The court of appeals 
indicated that a person with a law degree 
should be able to read question ten as 
clearly asking for any and all involvement 
in civil litigation and dismissed Gilbert's 
claim that he had misread the question. 
Gilbert was not a novice with the court 
system as he had confrontations with the 
law on many occassions during a six month 
period in 1967. During this period, Gilbert 
"was charged with conspiracy to commit 
forgery, forgery and uttering, murder and 
accessory to murder, homicide and as-
sault." Gilbert at 455. Out of these charges 
he was adjudicated guilty for forgery and 
uttering and he was imprisoned between 
November 1970 and August 1972. Shortly 
after these charges, Gilbert was arrested 
for the murder of his wife on June 4, 1967. 
On March 13, 1969, Gilbert and his sister 
were indicted for murder and conspiracy 
to commit murder. When Gilbert's sister 
was acquitted, his charges were nol prossed 
on June 24, 1974. 
Gilbert finally graduated from law 
school in 1980 and completed the applica-
tion in question on May 20, 1980. Shortly 
thereafter, Gilbert's petition "for expunge-
ment of all the records associated with the 
nol prossed indictment for his wife's mur-
der" was granted on June 23, 1980. Gilbert 
at 455. He passed the July 1980 Bar Ex-
amination and the next step was the char-
acter investigation to determine a can-
didate's present moral fitness to practice 
law in Maryland. 
The initial committee (character com-
mittee of the third judicial circuit), on Oc-
tober 21, 1980, recommended unanimously 
not to grant admission. The State Board of 
Law Examiners, pursuant to Rule 4c, con-
cluded by a 3-2 vote that Gilbert be ad-
mitted since he had the present moral char-
acter fitness to practice law. The weight 
used in these proceedings is clear and con-
vincing evidence. See In re Application of 
James G., 296 Md. 310,462 A.2d 1198 
(1983). In that case, the court looked at 
Gilbert's hardships through the years in-
cluding "the birth of a Down's Syndrome 
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child during his first marriage and the fact 
that his first wife [was murdered]." Gz1bert 
at 485. In determining his present moral 
character, the court noted that the history 
of criminal action occurred 16 years ago 
and was within a six month period. Also, 
the murder charge was nol prossed, and 
since 1981 Gilbert had practiced in the 
District of Columbia without incident. 
However, when the civil suit came to the 
attention of the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission (AGC), they conducted evidentiary 
hearings and filed a petition for disciplinary 
action. Gilbert insisted his nondisclosure 
was neither purposeful or material. Judge 
Thieme thought otherwise for the follow-
ing reasons: Gilbert's contention that the 
application was done in haste was discounted 
because by looking at the dates of his sig-
natures it was determined that at least 
three days transpired before the application 
was submitted and the non disclosure of 
the civil suit was purposeful because Gil-
bert had many opportunities to provide 
this information, but did not. 
The court of appeals found the context of 
the word "material" as used in DR 1-10 l(a) 
had never been previously defined in 
Maryland. The court used several anal-
ogies to other areas of law such as sum-
mary judgment-"whether the resolution 
of any material matter of fact may affect 
the outcome of the case," King v. Bankered 
303 Md 98, 111, 492 A.2d 688 ( 1985); and 
insurance- an "ommission" is material ifit 
would affect the insurer's decision about 
providing insurance or evaluating the risk." 
Maryland Indemnity v. Steers, 221 Md. 
380, 385, 157 A.2d 803 ( 1960). The court 
decided to adopt the definition that the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota applied 
in In re Howe, 257 N.W. 2d 420 (N.D. 
1977), which dealt with the same rule as 
the case at bar. Their definition of a mate-
rial omission is one that "has the effect of 
inhibiting the efforts of the bar to deter-
mine an applicant's fitness to practice 
law." Id. at 422. Overall, the various stan-
dards reflect on how the decision-making 
process is affected by a particular fact or 
representation. 
The court held that the nondisclosure of 
the civil suit enabled Gilbert to use his ex-
pungement in a self-serving manner that 
"plainly inhibited efforts to assess Gilbert's 
present moral character fitness to practice 
law." Gilbert at 460. Therefore, the omis-
sion was clearly material. Gilbert relied on 
In reApplication of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 
439 A.2d 1107 (1982) where there was 
nondisclosure of a criminal conviction. 
However, that case is easily distinguishable 
because G.L.S. volunteered additional in-
formation during the admission process 
unlike Gilbert. 
Gilbert's other contentions were also 
found to have no validity. Gilbert asserted 
that the civil suit had no bearing on the dis-
ciplinary proceedings, but the court ruled 
it was relevant in determining whether the 
omission was deliberate which has a direct 
bearing on one's present moral character. 
Gilbert also complained that his mother, 
father and a witness from his earlier trial 
should have been allowed to testify at the 
hearing. However, the witness' veracity 
was not at issue so his testimony was prop-
erly excluded. The only testimony allowed 
from Gilbert's parents was what state of 
mind Gilbert had as he worked on the ap-
plication and at no other time. Further-
more, Gilbert contends that the disciplin-
ary hearings had the effect of convicting 
him of his wife's murder thereby denying 
him due process of law. However, this is 
misplaced because the findings did not 
determine guilt or innocence, but only had 
a bearing on his fitness to practice law. 
Thus, the court of appeals has provided 
some guidelines as to what they consider a 
material omission on a bar application. If 
this omission reflects on a candidates truth-
fulness and candor, which is the most im-
portant character qualification, AGC v. 
Levitt, 286 Md. 238, 406 A.2d 1298 (1979), 
then strong disciplinary action will be called 
for. To determine if a purposefully dis-
honest omission or misrepresentation re-
quires disbarment as the proper sanction, 
the court will mainly look to the severity of 
the misconduct and any compelling exten-
uating circumstances. 
-Robert Feldman 
Department of Natural Resources v. 
Welsh: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
DID NOT BAR ACTION TO 
QUIET TITLE 
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that: ( 1) sovereign im-
munity did not bar action to quiet title 
based on the Department of Natural Re-
sources' allegedly unconstitutional taking, 
and (2) that the department had not ac-
quired interest in land belonging to plain-
tiff's predecessors, who had not been 
named as parties in earlier condemnation 
proceeding. Dep't. of Natural Resources v. 
Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 517 A.2d 722 (1986). 
As a result of this decision, the Rocky Gap 
State Park in Allegany County has lost a 
thirty three acre tract of land. 
In 1983, W. Mitchell Welsh brought 
suit against the Department of Natural 
Resources to quiet title to land. Appar-
ently, in 1966, the department obtained ti-
tle to a 1,000 acre tract in Allegany County 
through a condemnation proceeding. The 
metes and bounds description of the 1,000 
acre tract also included Welsh's thirty 
three acres. However, Mr. Welsh was not 
a party in the original 1966 condemnation 
proceeding against George E. Coffman 
et ux. 
The department had a title search con-
ducted on the land in question in 1966 in 
preparation for the condemnation proceed-
ing. This search conformed to the industry 
standard of sixty years. However, this 
search did not reveal the thirty three acre 
transfer by Maza Boor to Grafton Brant by 
deed dated August 20, 1877 and recorded 
March 5, 1878. Grafton Brant's thirty 
three acre tract through a series of con-
veyances is now vested in W. Mitchell 
Welsh. The same Maza Boor conveyed a 
1,000 acre tract to Delilah Boor by deed 
dated February 20, 1878 and recorded 
March 12, 1878. "Through a series of con-
veyances this 1,000 acre tract came into 
the possession of George E. Coffman and 
Loretta K. Coffman, his wife, by deed 
dated July 15, 1940." Dept of Natural Re-
sources 308 Md. at 56, 517 A.2d at 723. 
The metes and bounds description of the 
1,000 acre tract included the Welsh's thirty 
three acre tract: "Welsh became aware of 
the State's claim to the property in 1983 
when he was discussing a timber report 
with an employee of the department." Id. 
Consequently, he filed a quiet title action 
in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. 
The Circuit Court for Allegany County 
ruled against the department's defense of 
sovereign immunity. However, the trial 
court ruled that the department had ac-
quired title through the condemnation 
proceeding. Id. at 58, 517 A.2d at 724. On 
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion as to sovereign immunity, but reversed 
the trial court in its ruling that the depart-
ment had acquired title through the con-
demnation proceeding. Welsh v. Dep't. of 
Natural Resources, 65 Md. App. 710, 722, 
501 A.2d 1351, 1357 (1986). Thus, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the 
department's petition for a writ of certio-
rari so as to address the important ques-
tions presented by this case. 
The department urged reversal of the 
court of special appeals on two grounds. 
First, the department argued that no suit 
may be brought against them because of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 
58, 517 A.2d at 724. Second, "[t]he depart-
ment contends that it reasonably complied 
with eminent domain law and that, as a 
consequence, it acquired title to the tract 
in question." Id. at 66, 517 A.2d at 728. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
jected both arguments, and affirmed the 
judgment of the court of special appeals. 
''Under the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, neither a contract nor a tort action 
may be maintained against the State unless 
specific legislative consent has been given 
and funds (or the means to raise them) are 
available to satisfy the judgment." Id. at 
59, 517 A.2d at 724. However, Judge Smith 
stated that 
(t]he State, in the exercise of that 
power, (eminent domain], can only act 
lawfully, and any taking of property 
alleged to have been made by an agency 
of the State, not done in the mode pre-
scribed by law, is not the act of the 
State, but the unlawful usurpation by 
the individual taking or appropriating 
the property . . . 
Dept. of National Resources 308 Md. at 62, 
517 A.2d at 726 (quoting Dunne v. State, 
162 Md. 274, 287-88, 159 A. 751, 756, 
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932)). The 
court of appeals "[l]ong ago recognized 
that agents of the state do not enjoy im-
munity with respect to unlawful or uncon-
stitutional acts." I d. at 60, 517 A.2d at 725. 
The department, not knowing of Welsh's 
interest, committed an unlawful or uncon-
stitutional act by not notifying or joining 
Welsh in the original proceeding in 1966. 
Therefore, the court concluded that sover-
eign immunity was inapplicable since the 
department's actions were unlawful. 
The court of appeals had little trouble in 
disposing of the department's second con-
tention that it acquired the Welsh's tract 
under eminent domain. The court stated 
that "[i)t was incumbent upon the depart-
ment to designate as defendants the record 
owners of the tract in question." Id. at 67, 
517, A.2d at 728. The department only 
gained the interest or title of the defendant 
so designated. Consequently, since Welsh's 
predecessors in title were not designated, 
the court of appeals ruled "[ t ]hat the inter-
est of Welsh in the thirty three acres in 
dispute in the case at bar has not been ac-
quired by the department." Id. at 69, 517 
A.2d at 729. 
In conclusion, the decision of the court 
of appeals in this case may change the rule 
of sixty years in title searches since the 
sixty year search standard may as a result 
of this opinion not constitute a reasonable 
effort in determining title. All attorneys 
and title companies will be on notice that 
in determining title sixty years may not be 
an adequate time frame, or reasonable ef-
fort especially in cases involving eminent 
domain. 
-Rex S. Caldwen III 
Colorado v. Spring: DEFENDANT 
NEED NOT KNOW CONTENTS OF 
QUESTIONING TO EFFECT A 
VALID MIRANDA WAIVER. 
The United States Supreme Court re-
cently decided another case dealing with 
the often-litigated Miranda rights issue. In 
Colorado v. Spring, __ U.S. __ , 107 
S.Ct. 851 (1987), the Court held that a sus-
pect's awareness of all the crimes about 
which he may be questioned is not rele-
vant in determining the validity of his de-
cision to waive his Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. The Court's 
holding also resolved a conflict among the 
federal circuits, since prior to Spring sev-
eral circuits had found that a suspect's 
awareness of the subject matter of an inter-
rogation was a relevant factor to be consid-
ered in determining the validity of a Fifth 
Amendment privilege waiver. 
In 1979, respondent John Leroy Spring 
and a companion shot and killed a man in 
Colorado. Afterwards, agents of the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(ATF) received information from an in-
formant detailing respondent's involve-
ment in the interstate transportation of 
stolen firearms. The A TF agents set up an 
undercover purchase of firearms from re-
spondent, and on March 30, 1979, arrested 
him. 
The A TF agents advised respondent of 
his Miranda rights. Nevertheless, respon-
dent signed a written form stating that he 
understood and waived his rights, and pro-
ceeded to answer the A TF agents' ques-
tions. At first the A TF agents directed 
their questioning to the firearms transac-
tion that led up to the arrest. The agents 
then shifted their questioning and inquired 
whether respondent had ever shot anyone. 
Respondent answered that he had shot 
someone once. The agents eventually asked 
respondent if he had shot a man named 
Walker in Colorado. Respondent answered 
no, ending the interview. Respondent was 
placed in a Kansas City, Missouri jail. 
On May 26, 1979, Colorado law enforce-
ment officials visited respondent in Kansas 
City. Respondent was given Miranda warn-
ings, but again signed a written form indi-
cating that he understood his rights and was 
willing to waive them. The officers let it be 
known that they wished to ask questions 
about the Colorado homicide. In an inter-
view that lasted 1-'h hours, respondent 
confessed to the Colorado murder. 
Mr. Spring was charged in Colorado State 
Court with first degree murder. Spring 
moved to suppress both of his statements 
on the ground that his waiver of Miranda 
rights was invalid. The trial court found 
that the A TF agents' failure to inform re-
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